Record

Case file

1968-06-19

U.S. Government Publishing Office (govinfo), United States Statutes at Large, vol. 82

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III: Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (Public Law 90-351), 82 Stat. 211

Title III of the 1968 Act added chapter 119 to title 18: it prohibited private interception of wire and oral communications and set up court-ordered interception for listed offenses. Its findings state: "Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities."

Date
1968-06-19
Kind
case-file
Retrieved
2026-10-12
Docket
82 Stat. 197 (Public Law 90-351; H.R. 5037), Title III at 82 Stat. 211-225
Rights
An Act of Congress, a federal work in the public domain under 17 U.S.C. § 105. The text was read from the Statutes at Large PDF published by the U.S. Government Publishing Office on govinfo.

Public Law 90-351 (H.R. 5037), dated June 19, 1968, is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; it begins at 82 Stat. 197. Its Title III, at pages 211 to 225, adds chapter 119, “Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications”, to title 18.

The findings in section 801(c) read: “Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.” (82 Stat. 211.)

New section 2511 prohibits the willful interception, disclosure or use of wire or oral communications except as the chapter allows. Section 2516 lets the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him, authorize an application to a federal judge for an order approving interception by the FBI or another federal agency in investigating listed offenses. The list includes offenses involving murder, kidnapping, robbery or extortion, payments to labor organizations, and 18 U.S.C. 1084 (transmission of wagering information), 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or violence) and 1952 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering). Section 2516(2) separately allows a State’s principal prosecuting attorney to apply to a state judge where a state statute authorizes it. Section 803 (82 Stat. 223) rewrote section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, the provision at issue in Nardone v. United States, to begin “Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18”.

The FBI’s 1972 to 1988 history essay does not name Title III. It says: “By 1970, the FBI had gained some important new tools to go after mobsters—including court-authorized wiretaps, jurisdiction over mob-infiltrated businesses, and the ability to target entire crime families and their leaders instead of just bit players and isolated wise guys.” The govinfo text is OCR of the printed volume; only the parts named above were read.

itemNardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)Supreme Court decision of December 20, 1937 holding that section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 barred federal agents from testifying to the contents of telephone messages they had intercepted by wiretap, and reversing an alcohol-smuggling conviction.itemBerger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)Supreme Court decision of June 12, 1967 holding New York's permissive eavesdrop statute "too broad in its sweep" and so in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, reversing a conviction for conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of the State Liquor Authority.itemKatz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)Supreme Court decision of December 18, 1967 holding that FBI recording of a gambler's calls from a public telephone booth was a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and that the trespass doctrine of Olmstead was no longer controlling.itemOrganized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (18 U.S.C. 1961-1968), 84 Stat. 941-948Title IX of the 1970 Act, the RICO statute: it made it unlawful to conduct an enterprise's affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity", defined the predicate offenses, and provided prison terms, fines and forfeiture. Section 904 directs that it "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."itemOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)The Supreme Court holds, 4 June 1928, that federal prohibition officers' wiretapping of telephone lines without entering the defendants' premises was not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so the intercepted conversations were admissible.